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Peter Bearman
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Generalized exchange, in which sections of a tribe exchange women
in a cycle and thus guarantee social solidarity, was induced from
models of the norms governing classificatory kinship systems. A
blockmodel analysis of one aboriginal tribe yields sections that serve
as marriage classes in a generalized exchange system, though the
norms that govern kinship would fail to manifest, if followed, a cycle
for exchange. Generalized exchange systems emerge from inequali-
ties exogenous to the kinship system, specifically gerontocracy. Mod-
els of norms are weak predictors of actual exchange structures. Mod-
els of relations yield insight into the etiology of systems that build
social solidarity from social exchange.
When I was in my mother’s womb, social structure seemed a
simple thing. (Gang of Four)
INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on identifying the conditions under which social soli-
darity emerges from exchange relations. The empirical focus is on the
observed behaviors of persons whose exchanges induce a stable social or-
der. The setting (Groote Eylandt, an island off Australia), the persons
(Aborigines), the language in which exchange is conducted (kinship), the
relevant theoretical literature (classificatory kinship theory), and the val-
ues exchanged (women) are exotic for most sociologists. But many of the
issues involved—the relationship between normative orders governing
action and actual behaviors, the identification of micromechanisms that
yield stable emergent structures, and the relationship between solidarity,
exchange, and inequality—are central to problems we encounter in more
familiar settings.
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Models of Models and Models of Empirical Relations
Some deep theories about the nature of human society and the basis for
human order have been advanced with classificatory kinship systems as
referent (Homans 1962; Le´vi-Strauss 1969). These theories are mainly
derived from models of norms rather than models of actual social rela-
tions. The payoff has been the development of elegant models of exchange
structures, which Le´vi-Strauss and others argue yield social solidarity
(Le´vi-Strauss 1969; Ekeh 1974; Korn 1973; Uehara 1990; Yamagishi and
Cook 1993). Yet the patterns of exchange studied and the solidarity out-
comes theorized as their products tend to be ideals, not empirical realities.
Because this article works with tangible relational data, it turns this tradi-
tion on its head and consequently yields some new insights.
Traditionally, kinship theory is derived from models of the normative
rules governing marriage and descent in a society. In his classic statement,
Le´vi-Strauss (1969) argues that native norms provide a model of social
structure. For Le´vi-Strauss, the model is a grammar. Just as linguistic
grammar is the structure of language that organizes the placement of types
of words in sentences, the structure of kinship is the grammar that orga-
nizes the placement of people into social positions and the placement of
sections (subsets of the population) in systems of exchange. Here Le´vi-
Strauss’s argument is not subtle. It rests on the claim that the norms and
rules articulated by natives, the grammar of assignments to social posi-
tions, are the social structure.2 Thus it does not mean anything substan-
tively if people fail to behave in the prescribed ways, that is, to act “un-
grammatically.” Just as many people speak improperly without the
grammar of language being called into question, so it follows for Le´vi-
Strauss that people may act “irregularly” without the structure of kinship
rules being called into question. To understand how exchange yields soli-
darity, structural anthropologists like Le´vi-Strauss (1969) treat the gram-
mar of kinship as the relevant social structure to be modeled.
The strategy outlined by Le´vi-Strauss is powerful, but many observers
have a hard time cutting through noise in the field to identify clear norms.
For example, Worsley (1968, p. xxiv) notes, “I studied an Australian Ab-
original tribe [Groote Eylandt] where the knowledge of beliefs and rituals
of ‘their’ culture on the part of most members was abysmal: as elementary
and confused as that of the average Church of England congregation
member.” This sentiment is echoed in other studies of classificatory kin-
ship systems, where a “correct” understanding of norms, prescriptions,
culture, and ritual is seemingly held by only one or two informants. Such
2 Le´vi-Strauss (1963, p. 279), e.g., argues that “social structure has nothing to do with
empirical reality, but with models which are built after it.”
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normative disorder might well be expected. Demographic constraints and
contact with other societies with very different marriage systems combine
to force natives to piece together scraps of various rhetorical fabrics in
their search for an ideal normative structure coherent enough to regulate
social relations and ensure social solidarity. Further, local solutions to
classificatory “errors” are common, and these solutions are often at odds
with the formal normative models developed to account for these systems
(White 1963a; Rose 1960; Meggitt 1962). In real time (as opposed to genea-
logical time), classificatory kinship systems are very fluid. Perhaps quilt
patterns can provide an analogy: although the formal “normative” pattern
suggests a straightforward “nine patch,” the local reality seems much more
likely to yield a “drunkard’s path,” which, while nominally disordered, is
in fact highly ordered.
In this article, I use a nonnormative strategy for identifying the struc-
ture of social exchange among a population of Aborigines living on Groote
Eylandt in the early 1940s. That is, my model is not based on stated cul-
tural norms regarding the exchange of women.3 Instead, I model tangible,
named kinship relations among residents of Groote Eylandt. The exciting
finding is that, rather than disorder, I show that subsections of the tribe—
induced on the basis of structural equivalence—appear as marriage
classes that exchange women in a nearly perfect cycle.
Ethnographers living on Groote Eylandt found no clear positive pre-
scriptions guiding marriage choice and, in fact, claimed that the native
norms governing spouse choice on Groote Eylandt were so muddled that,
if they were followed, the kin system that these Aborigines did recognize
would be anarchic.4 Despite this, on Groote Eylandt, the apparently free
expression of marriage choices yields, in practice, increased constraint.
Because of this, natives are bound by a supple form of social solidarity—
chain generalized exchange.5
3 By anthropological convention, I refer to marriages as the exchange of women. One
could think about wife exchange as the exchange of brothers-in-law, but that is cum-
bersome. A problem is that wife exchange is not the same as the exchange of husbands,
since men commonly have more than one wife. The reality of Groote Eylandt society
is that girls (nine years old or so) were stolen, kidnapped, exchanged, or given away
by older men (25–40 years old), so in this case the convention carries substantive
meaning.
4 Rose (1960) argues that the normative system as natives articulate it is largely chaotic
and inconsistent. The normative demand of a classificatory kinship system is that the
cumulation of roles be patterned across individuals. For the relation “male marries,”
there is no discernible pattern that governs kin classification beyond the exogamy
restriction. This absence of pattern suggests anarchy.
5 Other nearly perfect or perfect exchange cycles have been observed for exchanges
of more traditional economic goods, e.g., the Kula ring system (Ziegler 1990; see Ya-
magishi and Cook [1993] for a recent review).
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Modeling the actual structure of kinship relations reveals order in the
pattern of marriages on Groote Eylandt, even though the natives do not
recognize that women are exchanged in a cycle and even though the cycle
that emerges bears no relationship to the cultural rhetoric claimed to gov-
ern their marriage choices. Furthermore, the “sections” that organize the
exchange of women are not recognized culturally; they are nominally in-
visible to natives. Despite this, however, natives penalize those who vio-
late this exchange structure, even though the various marriage choice
norms they do recognize (and describe to ethnographers) have not been
violated. These findings are unusual. Explaining how a system found pre-
dominantly in books appears in real life—where it is not supposed to—is
the task of this article. In the next section, I explore the relevant theoretical
issues, which set the stage for the empirical analyses that follow.
THEORETICAL ISSUES
Classificatory Kinship Systems and Structural Equivalence
Kinship is a social relationship. How others are understood as related to
us depends, not on blood, but on the grammar of assignment.6 This basic
principle is evident in our own kinship system, where many individuals
with quite different blood relations to us may all be classifed as “uncle,”
and even more clearly in Australian “section systems,” where individuals
with identical blood relations to a focal actor are often classified in differ-
ent ways (Le´vi-Strauss 1969).
Classificatory kinship systems, which appear simple, are very complex.
They rest on an enormous expansion of the kinship grammar, well beyond
the more familiar Western systems (White 1963b). The key to this expan-
sion is structural equivalence. Actors fully interchangeable, in terms of
public relations with all others, are structurally equivalent. Structurally
equivalent actors share the same social position. As a result, they occupy
the same roles and hold similar kinds of obligations and debts to similar
others. In modern settings, pure equivalence is rare and must be socially
engineered: the army private and the bishop in the Catholic Church are
two obvious examples. In elementary (classificatory) kinship systems,
brothers, like privates in the army, are theoretically interchangeable, that
is, they ought to occupy the same relationship to all others.
Thus under the logic of classificatory kinship, an individual’s father’s
6 A kinship grammar is a set of rules about the organization of kin terms. For an
analogy, consider the grammar of friendship in high schools, which asserts that the
friend (F ) of a friend (F ) is a friend (F ), so FF 5 F. If we find for some students that
friends of friends are not friends but enemies (E ), so that FF 5 E, then the normative
grammar still exists but is not observed empirically.
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brothers (uncles) would be classificatory fathers to him or her. It follows
that mother’s sisters (aunts) are classed as mother—they are classificatory
mothers—and thus their daughters (cousins) must be classificatory sisters.
A fundamental fact of classificatory kinship systems is that members of
a tribal section are structural equivalents. As White (1963b, pp. 81–82)
notes: “[Every] person in one [section] can agree on the relations of every
pair included. Of course I can always agree on how two people are related
to each other by putting myself in one of their places as ego, but it is only
in a classificatory system that I as ego can group others in exactly the
same clusters of equivalence as they do.”
For our purposes, a central feature of ideal-typical classificatory kinship
systems is that, as a result of the classificatory logic, the only women that
a man may marry are members of the section that provides women to his
section. Showing this requires a complicated algorithm (White 1963a;
Boyd 1991), but the logic of classificatory kinship makes life simpler. The
fundamental problem is knowing who one is to marry. People need some
way to figure out where their spouse is coming from. But individuals do
not need a mathematical model to do the right thing. They do not even
need to understand the global logic. Instead, they only need to follow a
normative rule that prescribes the class of spouses they may marry.
In classificatory kinship systems, all men should marry women in the
same kinship relation to them; for example, their father’s sister’s daughter
(FZD) and/or their mother’s brother’s daughter (MBD). There are many
different possible systems, and each system defines a different class of
eligible spouses. Whatever relations are normatively endorsed, men (or
women) can know they are marrying a person in the right relation to them
if they are in the right section and are not otherwise prohibited (White
1963a). Because the logic of these kinship systems is so consistent, mem-
bers of a section will be structurally equivalent. Therefore potential wives
(from a male’s perspective) are (in theory) all members of a unique section.
It follows that, if we are to identify the sections in aboriginal societies that
exchange women, the core element must be that individuals in each sec-
tion are, as reported in the kin system, structurally equivalent. For one
tribe, I induce such sections and show that cyclic generalized exchange
occurs even in the absence of clear normative rules prescribing it.
Social Scarcity and Social Exchange
Why exchange in the first place? The answer emerges by focusing on what
is uniquely social about social exchange. I start with Adam Smith. Smith
([1776] 1965, p. 15) argues that men distinguish themselves from other
animals through exchange, noting that “it [exchange] is common to all
men, and to be found in no other race of animals” and further that “nobody
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ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for an-
other with another dog.” Critics of Smith have already noted that it is
reasonable to wonder how dogs would benefit from an exchange of bones,
since a fair exchange presumes that the values given and received (in this
instance, bones) are the same. Bones are bones. While this appears to be
a reasonable criticism, it is naive and misses what is essential to social
exchange—that it yields social solidarity. People exchange equivalent val-
ues. Dogs do not. Dogs just do not know how to benefit from the exchange
of equivalent values. They cannot turn the exchange relation into a role
structure. People can, and do.
If dogs could define their bones as “bones they cannot chew,” an ex-
change of otherwise equivalent bones would make more sense. A negative
proscription, “you may chew others’ bones but not yours,” induces a posi-
tive incentive to exchange one bone for another. Bones that are prevalent
locally would become prohibited and therefore scarce. Prohibited (and
scarce) values are useful for exchange, especially if all the parties need
them. Of course, this is the case with the incest taboo that prohibits “mar-
riage” with some kin relations. The incest taboo requires an exchange, the
“gift” of a prohibited relation to another person. Because the values that
are exchanged (sisters, brothers-in-law) are not objectively scarce in na-
ture, and therefore need not be exchanged with others in the absence of
a prohibition, the incest taboo may be seen as the first truly social or cul-
tural act (Le´vi-Strauss 1969). Smith was right, if for the wrong reason.
Animals do not exchange values that are equivalent because they cannot
prohibit themselves from using the values they have. That takes thought.
Men may give classificatory sisters who are prohibited, and therefore
of no value to them as marriage partners, up to other men. The gift begs
others to exchange their classificatory sisters in return. Yet the incest taboo
only insists that men not marry their own “sister”; it does not require the
“release” of sisters to other men. If sisters are “released,” it is without guid-
ance with respect to which men they should go. If men want a wife, the
negative rule (you may not marry people in some kinship relation) insists
on exchange but does not positively prescribe a structure through which
exchange is to occur. Without a positive prescription, or a norm of reci-
procity, givers of sisters have no guarantee that they will become takers
of wives. A univocal gift is risky; it is an invitation to exploitation.
A negative norm (the taboo against incest) creates an incentive to ex-
change but fails to provide individuals or groups with a structure through
which exchange can occur. For a structure for exchange to emerge, it is
assumed that a positive norm—a norm of reciprocity—or a positive pre-
scription (you may only exchange with persons B) is required. Exchange
theorists (Le´vi-Strauss 1969; Ekeh 1974; Yamagishi and Cook 1993) dis-
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Fig. 1.—Direct (restricted) social exchange
tinguish two forms of exchange: direct (restricted) exchange and indirect
(generalized) exchange. Direct, or restricted, exchange is the dyadic ex-
change of values, a gift given induces a direct reciprocation: a bone for a
bone or, perhaps, a spouse for a bone. The key is that dyads exchange
values back and forth between themselves; they form an exchange pair.
Figure 1 represents this kind of exchange structure.
In indirect, or generalized, exchange, values move in one direction
across a network of at least three actors. There are two main forms of
generalized exchange. In this article, I focus on one type, “chain” general-
ized exchange, as distinct from “net” generalized exchange (Ekeh 1974;
Sahlins 1965; Uehara 1990; Yamagishi and Cook 1993). “Net” generalized
exchange, which involves exchanges between an individual (A) and a
group (BCDE), is relatively common and is represented in figure 2. Play
groups, carpools, revolving credit associations, and duplicate bridge
games in which the players cycle through hosts are all examples. Review-
ers of journal articles participate in net generalized exchange systems as
well when they submit their own article for review. Chain generalized
exchange is qualitatively different, as shown in figure 3. Whereas net gen-
eralized exchange can be reduced to direct “person-to-group” dyadic ex-
changes as in Blau (1964), chain generalized exchange cannot. The key
in chain generalized exchange is that values have to flow through all par-
ties in a cycle before a giver can become a taker, that is, receive a gift in
return.
Fig. 2.—Indirect (generalized) social exchange: net form
1389
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 13 Feb 2015 15:05:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Journal of Sociology
Fig. 3.—Indirect (generalized) social exchange: chain form
The Norm of Reciprocity
Both generalized exchange and restricted exchange rest on a norm of reci-
procity: takers are obliged to be givers. In direct dyadic exchange, the
norm of reciprocity insists that takers give gifts to those who gave to them.
The help I get with an article is a gift I return by an acknowledgment. I
give the gift of attendance at a dinner party in exchange for the food the
host provides. The norm of reciprocity provides guidance to both parties.
Hosts do not provide food for guests who forget to come, and dinner par-
ties would be few if hosts did not exchange food for the social efforts
guests expend when they do arrive. Ambiguity over valuation of gifts re-
ceived and taken may lead to subsequent streams of exchange (Leifer
1988). Dyadic exchanges governed by a norm of reciprocity lock actors
into “endless” exchanges, as each alternates occupying giver and taker
roles. These roles, and the exchanges within pairs, provide the basis for
a weak form of social solidarity.7
In chain generalized exchange, the norm of reciprocity insists, as well,
7 Within dyadic exchange, there will always be some transgressions of the reciprocity
norm, but dissonance over the valuation of gifts given and taken rather than true
violations of the norm is the central mechanism of exploitation. Others may be cads
now and then, but even those who at first glance seem to build careers by transgressing
reciprocity norms—grifters and confidence men—rely on them. “Gifts” from confi-
dence men only work when the taken mistakenly think themselves to be takers, creat-
ing the irony that exploitation is easier if the norm of reciprocity is adhered to (Leifer
1988; Waller [1937] 1970).
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that takers give. But they give to someone else. In systems of chain gener-
alized exchange, many of the exploitation possibilities inherent in direct
exchange are elided. This is no world for a confidence man. If he succeeds
in eliciting a gift (in exchange), it goes elsewhere. Under generalized ex-
change, where gifts are univocal and givers are always givers, exploitation
can take place only if actors explicitly reject the guiding norm of reciproc-
ity. In this case, individuals or subgroups contemplating the exploitation
of givers find little room for subtle action and thus face sanction from the
entire group whose debt they have failed to repay.
As with restricted exchange, in chain generalized exchange, the norm
of reciprocity guides actors to return gifts. But to whom should they give?
When exchange involves sisters for wives, the incest taboo alone is no
help. It does not positively tell actors who should be the recipient of the
returned gift; it only excludes potential receivers. A cyclic system that
fixes, for each dyad, giver and taker roles in perpetuity has certain advan-
tages over restricted exchange systems. The role structure induced by cy-
clic exchange allows for the exchange of equivalent values without ambi-
guity. Giving is secured by the fact that subtle exploitation across dyadic
exchange pairs is impossible. In contrast, restricted exchange provides op-
portunities for exploitation within pairs of exchange partners because
actors on the outside may be largely indifferent to the exchange outcomes
they observe. Because, under restricted exchange, self-interest is largely
independent of other pairs’ exchanges, actors are under no obligation to
enforce collective norms. Two things result from this indifference. The
first is that exploitation may characterize dyadic exchanges, thereby weak-
ening one party or group by allowing inequalities to emerge between pairs.
The second is more troublesome for group solidarity; interacting pairs
may cleave away from the whole group, thereby creating a new, and self-
sufficient, exchange system.8
Generalized exchange systems block these inherent tendencies toward
subgroup cleavage. First, each section in the system cares a lot about every
exchange. They are all invested in preventing dyadic exploitation. Sec-
ondly, in a cycle, there is no endogenous or structural basis for subgroup
cleavage. Failing to adhere to the norm of reciprocity drains everyone of
a scarce resource and, as a result, “allows the realization of more supple
and effective solidarity” (Le´vi-Strauss 1969). As a result, generalized ex-
change systems, once established, should be remarkably robust, for the
only threats to their stability are exogenous in nature. Such systems are
8 Note that exploitation is not a necessary outcome of restricted exchange. Here I
simply argue that under certain circumstances (e.g., when group sanctioning mecha-
nisms are weak), restricted exchange may provide a framework from which exploita-
tion occurs.
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presented as ideals, as logical outcomes of normative structures. Nobody
really thinks they are real, but if they are, what accounts for them?
CONTEXT, DATA, AND METHODS
Groote Eylandt
In the 1940s, approximately 350 Aborigines lived on Groote Eylandt and
neighboring Woodah and Bickerton Islands. Population density was one
Aborigine per three square miles, three times the average for mainland
aboriginal tribes (Rose 1960). By aboriginal standards, food and water
were plentiful. In common with mainland aboriginal tribes, the sexual
division of labor was rigid. Prestige and status were based on age and
gender. Gerontocracy was pronounced, with older men controlling access
to women, ritual knowledge, and material resources. Natives lived in kin-
based cooperating groups composed of two or three adult brothers and
their dependent wives and children. In two exceptional cases, single-
family units lived in isolation from all other groups.
Residence was patrilocal; descent was patrilineal. Groote Eylandt Abo-
rigines recognized 11 sections, loosely associated with locality. Sections
were assigned to one of two moieties. Many natives could not correctly
identify the section they belonged to (Rose 1960). In addition to section,
natives belonged to totemic groups called the “dreamtime.” The
dreamtime connects individuals together on a different basis than
“straight” kinship. The dreamtime is a ritual world; if kinship is econom-
ics, dreaming is comparative literature. Assignment of Aborigines to these
totemic groups was determined by the mother’s geographical location on
the island when she publicly acknowledged conception. Since residence
was patrilocal, the totem of a child was generally associated with his/her
father. Gender, age, section, and totemic group are the only forms of social
differentiation—other than kinship—discussed by ethnographers as rec-
ognized on Groote Eylandt.
Norms Governing Exchange on Groote Eylandt
The rules governing spouse choice on Groote Eylandt are pretty vague.
There are many of them, and they are contradictory. Because of this, dif-
ferent observers have argued that the Groote Eylandt system is similar
to many different classificatory kinship systems found in Australia, from
the Kariera to the Aranda. The problem is that a single society cannot
coherently follow two or more contradictory normative systems at the
same time.
For example, there is a norm on Groote Eylandt that men should marry
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Fig. 4.—Kariera classificatory kinship system
their classificatory cross-cousins, their FZDs (who are also their MBDs).
This norm suggests a Kariera system, in which classificatory cousins are
exchanged dyadically across pairs of sections. Such a system is represented
in figure 4. In the Kariera system, a male in section 1 marries a female
in section 2. Their children are assigned to section 4 but reside with their
father in section 1. Turning the pair around, a male from section 2 will
marry a female from section 1; their children will be assigned to section
3 and will reside in section 2. A Kariera system rests on bilateral cross-
cousin marriage with exchange of sisters. There is a lot of ethnographic
evidence that the ideal marriage, given Groote Eylandt kinship terminol-
ogy, would fit a Kariera model. Specifically, Groote Eylandt Aborigines
not only do not prohibit FZD marriages, their stated norms endorse them.
Furthermore, Worsley (cited in Rose 1960) argues that the “ideal pattern
of kinship terminology implies an exchange of sisters.” As I show later,
while endorsed, such marriages are impossible in practice.
Leaving aside for the moment the norm recommending FZD marriage,
Rose (1960), Worsley (as cited in Rose 1960), and Warner (1958) all suggest
that other aspects of Groote Eylandt kinship terminology suggest the pos-
sibility of an Aranda-like kinship system. Specifically, there is another
norm on Groote Eylandt that prescribes distant mother’s brother’s daugh-
ter (MBD) and mother’s mother’s brother’s daughter’s daughter
(MMBDD) marriages. Such marriages are the basis for an Aranda system.
Aranda kinship and descent systems have four lineages (two in each moi-
ety), each divided into alternating-generation subsections that exchange
women dyadically. Figure 5 describes the flow of wives across numbered
sections (W) and the assignment of children to sections (C) in an Aranda
system. For example, men in section 3 marry women in section 1 and
women in section 3 marry men in section 1. Looking at the assignment
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Fig. 5.—Aranda classificatory kinship system
of children (C), the children of a 1F → 3M marriage are assigned to section
5, while the children of a 3F → 1M marriage are assigned to section 8.
In an Aranda system, marriage with one’s MMBDD (from a male view-
point) ensures that the person that an individual is supposed to marry is
in the right section. Note that under this system, marriage with one’s FZD
is prohibited. Therefore, the Aranda norm contradicts the Kariera norm.
Both systems cannot work at the same time. Referring to figure 5, one
can see that marriages with a FZD would be incorrect, whereas marriages
with a MMBDD make the system work.9
Because on Groote Eylandt marriage with a male’s MMBDD (who is
also a distant MBD) is also prescribed, an Aranda system, like a Kariera,
9 Consider, e.g., a male in section 3 looking for a wife. The normative rules tell him
to marry his MMBDD. She is in section 1 because
his M is in section 7;
his MM is in section 4;
his MMD is in section 4;
his MMBD is in section 6; and
his MMBDD is in section 1.
Thus men in section 3 get wives from section 1, in exchange for sisters they gave to
section 1 earlier.
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is potentially supported by local norms. But again, one society cannot
be both Kariera and Aranda. And it gets worse. Other elements of the
ethnographically revealed normative structure suggest similarities with
other systems, the description of which is beyond the scope of this article.
Rose (1960, p. 153) concludes that “the Groote Eylandt kinship system
could very easily be described as a Kariera, Aranda, Karadjeri, or possibly
even an Ungarinyin type.”
Two things are clear from this review of possible systems and their fit
with Groote Eylandt kinship norms. The first is that the normative struc-
ture governing marriage choices on Groote Eylandt is too vague and con-
tradictory to yield a single consistent exchange system. Incompatible sys-
tems are simultaneously endorsed, and the result is a hodgepodge.10 The
second is that there is no normative evidence for a cycle of exchange across
named sections. Certainly it is hard to see how a system with 11 recognized
sections could fit one of these ideal types. The only thing everyone can
agree on is that men are prohibited from marrying women in their moiety.
Rose’s Ethnographic Data
Kinship data, gathered prior to detribalization, is provided in Rose (1960)
for 221 of the 350 natives living on Groote Eylandt, a 1,000 square mile
island located in the Gulf of Carpenteria, off Northern Arnheim Land,
Australia, in the early 1940s.11 Thirty-two kinship relations—mother,
mother’s brother, older brother, mother’s brother’s daughter, sister, and
so forth—are uniquely identified. As each relation has a role complement,
mother/daughter, older brother/younger brother, accuracy in identifica-
tions can be estimated by consistency across pairs. Of all the identifica-
tions that were reciprocated, 98% were correct. Over 24,000 relationships
(51% of the 48,620 possible) between the 221 persons surveyed were col-
lected. Adults were able to identify and report their relationship to 77%
of the Aborigines in the sample.
Rose’s methodology was simple and innovative. He took photographs
of Aborigines and asked others what they called them, for example, what
kinship relation they were in. He collected data only on living Aborigines.
10 Because groups cannot theoretically follow more than one kinship system at the
same time without yielding disorder, it does not really help to argue that order comes
from the fact that norms governing marriage choice may operate in some contexts
but not others. Of interest are the mechanisms that effectively translate such micro-
level “incoherence” into a coherent macrostructure.
11 Rose fails to discuss selectivity associated with his sample. Missing are young men
(10–13 years old), presumably not married, who spent their time in the bush and
therefore could not be reached.
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As a result, these data are different than those gathered by more tradi-
tional ethnographic methods, which rely on gathering normative informa-
tion from a few informants. More traditional methods allow natives to
articulate ideal images of the kinship system (who one should marry, ig-
noring actual behavior); Rose’s data make possible tests of the fit between
the ideal (normative) models of a kinship system and the practical reality
of kinship relations as experienced by natives. Rose’s kinship data are
especially valuable since current research on aboriginal social structure
is now complicated by detribalization. Life on Groote Eylandt at the time
of Rose’s fieldwork was probably very much the same as it was prior to
Western contact.
Relations and Aborigines Sampled
The population of interest is the 151 Aborigines on Groote Eylandt who
were married or of marriageable age in 1941. For girls, this meant anyone
over one year of age. Males typically first married girls aged 1–9 after
they were 25 years old. The kin relations of interest for marriage exchange
are cross-moiety relations. These are defined by Rose (1960, p. 60) as the
“key relationships in the Groote Eylandt system.”12
Data reporting each aggregate relation were transformed into five 151
3 151 matrices. These kinship matrices report whether or not an Aborig-
ine is in a specific aggregate relation to another Aborigine. Thus, if an
Aborigine in row i calls an Aborigine in column j “mother’s brother’s
daughter” (MBD), a “1” indexes that j is MBD to i. Thus in cell ij, a “1”
is reported. These five matrices served as the raw data for subsequent
analyses.
12 The relations selected comprise 20 unique English equivalents, identified below.
Each is associated with a unique aboriginal name, e.g., MBD is named denda and
FZD is named dabura, whereas in English we would say “cousin” even though we
can distinguish them as FZD and MBD. Likewise, denda is also the term for “mother”
and dabura is the term for “sister’s sister.” Rose collapses these detailed kin relations
into aggregate categories and presents data on the categories of equivalent kinship
relations. My models take these kinship data as their central input. These relations
are defined by Rose (1960, p. 18) as
1. mother’s brother (MB), mother (M), mother’s brother’s son (MBS), mother’s
brother’s daughter (MBD)
2. mother’s mother’s brother’s daughter’s son (MMBDS), mother’s mother’s broth-
er’s daughter’s daughter (MMBDD), wife (W), husband’s sister (HZ), wife’s
brother (WB), husband (H)
3. sister’s son (ZS), sister’s daughter (ZD), father’s sister’s daughter (FZD), father’s
sister’s son (FZS)
4. father’s mother’s brother (FMB), father’s mother (FM), daughter’s daughter
(DD), daughter’s son (DS)
5. mother’s father (MF), mother’s father’s sister (MFZ)
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TABLE 1
Groote Eylandt Aborigines by Moiety: Population and Sample
Age Cohorts (in Years)
Sex 0–9 10–19 20–29 30–39 401 Total
Moiety 1:
Males:
Population ..................... 19 12 10 11 12 64
Sample ........................... 0 3 3 7 10 23
Females:
Population ..................... 12 14 7 4 9 46
Sample ........................... 11 14 7 4 7 43
Moiety 2:
Males:
Population ..................... 17 11 10 14 9 61
Sample ........................... 0 2 6 13 8 29
Females:
Population ..................... 10 12 9 4 11 46
Sample ........................... 7 12 9 4 8 40
Sample Characteristics
The sample of all married Aborigines differs with respect to age and gen-
der composition from the population as a whole, as should be expected.
These distributions are reported as frequencies, by moiety, in table 1.13
The large number of infant females and the small number of young
men in the sample reflect the fact that men marry women who are on
average more than 20 years younger than themselves. There are more
women than men because of extensive polygamy. As men age, they ac-
quire wives. The average number of wives (per married man) increases
from 1.3 for men aged 21–30, to 1.8 for men aged 31–40, and to 2.9 for
men aged 41–50 (Rose 1960, p. 69). Since men obtain more wives as they
age, it follows logically that women are married polygamously as well.
For women in their peak reproductive years (aged 15–28), 83% of their
husbands have at least a second wife (Rose 1960, pp. 87, 247–465).
RESULTS
Modeling Groote Eylandt Kinship with Named Sections
In this section, I focus on modeling the pattern of wife exchange across
the 11 named marriage sections Rose identifies as present on Groote Ey-
13 Results reported in the body of the article are restricted to the 135 Aborigines cur-
rently married or promised as spouses in 1941.
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landt. The goal is to identify a parsimonious model that captures the ob-
served pattern of exchanges. Tests of different kinds of exchange systems
are possible using log-linear models. The relevant modeling context is de-
rived from work on social mobility (Bearman and Deane 1993; Sobel,
Hout, and Duncan 1985); blocks (sections of structurally equivalent
actors) are treated as classes in a marriage system, and the structure of
the flow of women across these classes is the key focus.
I begin with the incest taboo, which requires men to marry women from
the opposite moiety. Table 2 reports the mobility of women from origin
(rows) to destination (columns) by culturally recognized, or named, sec-
tion. Consider this mobility as the “gift” of a sister. An inspection of table
2 clearly reveals the presence of an exogamy rule that insists that marriage
be with a spouse from the opposite moiety. The consequence of this nor-
mative rule is zeros in all within-moiety marriage cells. Since I am search-
ing for structure in exchange beyond a negative prohibition, I treat these
zeros as structural rather than sampling zeros in all of the models that
follow.14 Model fits are estimated using GLIM (Baker and Nelder 1978).
Given exogamy across moiety, I test whether section of origin carries im-
plications for section of destination. An independence model tests whether
the association between origin (as sisters) and destination (as wives) is
determined solely by the cross-moiety marginals—in this case, the propor-
tion of persons assigned to one of the 11 sections that natives recognize.
Call this a moiety model. A test of the moiety model, which fits a grand
mean and the main effect of origin and destination,15 fits the observed
exchanges, yielding a log-likelihood ratio (G2) of 45.18 with df 5 32; and
P 5 .061. This tells us that there is no deep structure to the pattern of
exchange beyond moiety, at least using culturally recognized sections as
the exchange units. Ethnographers were right to observe a hodgepodge,
for a simple model of exogamous exchanges across moieties provides a
satisfactory image of Groote Eylandt social structure, using their own cat-
egories as exchange sections.16
14 It is possible to fit determined models with structural zeros easily (Lindsey 1989).
Note that the degrees of freedom reported for all models are greatly reduced due to
the presence of structural zeros.
15 The equation for the moiety (independence) model (Agresti 1990, eq. [5.2], p. 131)
is
log mij 5 µ 1 λi 1 λj.
Since section 8 sent no women, I combined sections 8 and 9 to yield a 10-section
system.
16 Although there is no formal reason to expect that a structure for exchange exists
across totemic groups, I tested the same independence model using totems as catego-
ries. The model fits exceptionally well (G2 5 27.44; df 5 30; P 5 .6003). This means
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Recall that aspects of the Groote Eylandt kinship terminology imply
bilateral cross-cousin marriage with exchange of sisters, as does the ab-
sence of a prohibition against father’s sister’s daughter (FZD) marriage.
These norms are consistent with a Kariera system, yielding restricted
rather than generalized exchange. While there is normative support for
sister-exchange marriages, due to demographic constraints, the chance of
their occurrence is extremely low.17 Nor is there any evidence in table 2
that the actual exchanges observed across sections yield an Aranda sys-
tem, which assumes paired sections. Thus, although both ideal-typical
models are suggested by the normative rules, the most we can uncover
using culturally recognized sections is a moiety model.
This finding, that the observed structure of exchange, beyond strict ad-
herence to an exogamy rule, does not fit the outcomes of formally pre-
scribed norms, is commonplace. Norms are a model, an ideal. We should
not necessarily expect them to be realized in practice. But something be-
yond exogamy (sidedness) does structure the exchange of women (White
and Jorian 1997). In the next section, I go beyond identifying “sidedness”
to show that the deep structure of marriage exchange on Groote Eylandt
is cyclical across blocks of structurally equivalent actors.
Operationalizing Structural Equivalence
Since it follows that, in classificatory kinship systems, sections that play
a role in the social exchange of women are defined by structural equiva-
lence, it should be possible to induce these sections (marriage classes) from
a model that partitions the population into blocks of structurally equiva-
lent actors. Blockmodeling (White, Boorman, and Brieger 1976; Boorman
and White 1976; Burt 1980) is one method for generating structural equiv-
alence in a social network. The basic strategy in blockmodeling is to in-
duce a partition of a social network, where nodes are aggregated into
blocks on the basis of similar patterns of relations. This aggregation of
that there is no structure to the exchange of women across totems beyond exogamy
by moiety.
17 As Rose notes (1960, p. 177), “If exchange marriage were possible then in the ideal
case we would expect that a girl of about nine years is married to a man about 34
and that girl of nine years has a full brother aged 34 years who receives as wife the
first man’s full sister also aged 9 years.” Homans’s (1962) argument that matrilateral
cross-cousin marriage occurs more frequently than patrilateral cross-cousin marriage
in patrilineal systems because of the positive sentimental ties a male has to his moth-
er’s brother cannot be right. The problems are demographic. First, under a geronto-
cratic social system, the male who is to marry his father’s sister’s daughter (FZD)
when she reaches puberty has probably not yet been conceived. Second, even if he
were born, his FZD is likely to be his classificatory mother (Rose 1960, pp. 120–23).
On this basis we can reject a Kariera model.
1399
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 13 Feb 2015 15:05:57 PM




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 13 Feb 2015 15:05:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Generalized Exchange
structurally equivalent actors into blocks means that actors have homoge-
neous internal relations and homogeneous external relations with others,
for all relations considered simultaneously (Wasserman and Faust 1995).
The blockmodel output is an homomorphic reduction of the raw net-
work data, referred to as an image matrix. A blockmodel shows how pat-
terns of social relations in a population bind nodes into structurally equiv-
alent bundles. Consider blocks as positions and an image matrix a model
of a network of positions. This model is a model of social structure—but
it is empirically grounded. In theory, the blockmodel is a pure distillation
of the more complex social structure it represents. Since our social identi-
ties are shaped by the positions we occupy, a blockmodel is interpreted
as an identity array generated from patterns of social ties linking persons
in a social network.
The five aggregated kinship matrices were stacked on top of one an-
other, to form a 755 3 151 matrix. CONCOR, a commonly used block-
modeling algorithm, was used to partition the stacked matrix (White et
al. 1976). The first partition of the matrix yielded moiety, as expected.
Three further partitions for each moiety yielded eight blocks, four in each
moiety.18
After running the CONCOR algorithm, all Aborigines were assigned
to one of eight blocks. All block members share moiety but are otherwise
heterogeneous with respect to demographic characteristics and culturally
recognized categories. Other than moiety, the cultural categories that are
recognized by natives (section, age, gender, totem) are neither statistically
nor substantively associated with block membership. Equivalence is thus
not derived from shared categorical attributes. Below I focus on the struc-
ture of exchange (mobility) of women across blocks.
The Structure of Exchange across Blocks
In theory, blocks of structural equivalents could function as sections in
an exchange system, even if—as is the case here—these sections are cul-
turally unnamed. On Groote Eylandt, there are no words that describe
the induced blocks in the marriage exchange system, and therefore these
blocks, while culturally constructed, cannot be culturally recognized.
They neither fit the named sections nor the totems of Groote society. Ear-
lier, I showed that native prescriptive norms governing marriage choice
could never sustain a generalized exchange system. Yet such a system
18 The cutoff used was relatively strict (.95). Correlations were computed on columns
only, since 98% of all relations were symmetric. In other models, I attempted to yield
the 11 section system that was recognized by the Aborigines on Groote Eylandt, but
no partition reproduced their categories.
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TABLE 3
Exchange of Women across Blocks
Destination
Moiety 1 Moiety 2
Origin 1 5 4 8 7 2 6 3
1 ............................ 20 20 20 20 7 3 0 0
5 ............................ 20 20 20 20 0 9 0 0
4 ............................ 20 20 20 20 0 1 9 0
8 ............................ 20 20 20 20 1 0 2 11
7 ............................ 1 5 0 0 20 20 20 20
2 ............................ 4 0 11 2 20 20 20 20
6 ............................ 0 0 0 7 20 20 20 20
3 ............................ 9 0 0 1 20 20 20 20
Note.—Structural zeros are reported as “20.”
emerges from practical behavior. Below, I show that natives manage kin-
ship relations under the watchful eyes of a constraint imposed by the oper-
ation of generalized exchange, even though their tribal norms do not de-
mand such a constraint.
Table 3 reports the mobility of women from origins (as sisters) to desti-
nations (as wives) across the induced blocks, or marriage classes. Recall
the unusual tabular structure from table 2, which placed structural zeros
in the cells corresponding to within-moiety marriages. This tabular struc-
ture is replicated here.
Table 4 reports log-likelihood ratios (G2), degrees of freedom, and P
values for models of the pattern of spouse choice across blocks. Following
the logic of the section-to-section models, I begin by testing a moiety (inde-
pendence) model. However, this model does not fit the observed data and
can clearly be rejected (G2 5 158.1; df 5 18; P , .001). The exchange of
women across blocks is not random; this means that, unlike the section-
by-section model, there is structure in the pattern of exchange beyond
exogamy by moiety.
In an attempt to uncover this structure, I test all possible patterns of
pair exchange (quasi-symmetry models) to see if either a Kariera or an
Aranda structure fits the observed data.19 Recall that some norms on
19 The equation for the sister exchange (quasi-symmetry) model (Agresti 1990, p. 354,
eq. [10.11]) is
log mij 5 µ 1 λXi 1 λYj 1 λXYij ,
where λXYij 5 1, when i and j are paired, and λXYij 5 0 for all other values of i and j.
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TABLE 4
Models of the Structure of Exchange of Women across
Blocks
Model G2 df P
Independence (random association) ......... 158.1 18 0.00
Paired dyadic exchange ............................. 14
1/5; 2/6; 3/7; 4/8 ..................................... 180.3 0.00
1/5; 2/7; 3/8; 4/6 ..................................... 144.5 0.00
1/5; 2/8; 3/6; 4/7 ..................................... 150.2 0.00
1/5; 2/6; 3/8; 4/7 ..................................... 254.8 0.00
1/5; 2/7; 3/6; 4/8 ..................................... 129.2 0.00
1/5; 2/8; 3/7; 4/6 ..................................... 139.6 0.00
1/6; 2/7; 3/8; 4/5 ..................................... 155.7 0.00
1/6; 2/7; 3/5; 4/8 ..................................... 122.4 0.00
1/6; 2/8; 3/7; 4/5 ..................................... 149.5 0.00
1/6; 2/8; 3/5; 5/7 ..................................... 122.0 0.00
1/6; 2/5; 4/7; 4/8 ..................................... 170.5 0.00
1/6; 2/5; 3/8; 4/7 ..................................... 133.9 0.00
1/7; 2/8; 3/5; 4/6 ..................................... 104.5 0.00
1/7; 2/8; 3/6; 4/8 ..................................... 121.2 0.00
1/7; 2/5; 3/8; 4/6 ..................................... 118.1 0.00
1/7; 2/5; 3/6; 4/8 ..................................... 127.5 0.00
1/7; 2/6; 3/8; 4/5 ..................................... 135.9 0.00
1/7; 2/6; 3/5; 4/8 ..................................... 128.4 0.00
1/8; 2/5; 3/6; 4/7 ..................................... 120.4 0.00
1/8; 2/5; 3/7; 4/6 ..................................... 123.9 0.00
1/8; 2/6; 3/7; 4/5 ..................................... 128.1 0.00
1/8; 2/6; 3/5; 4/7 ..................................... 142.7 0.00
1/8; 2/7; 3/6; 4/5 ..................................... 118.9 0.00
1/8; 2/7; 3/5; 4/6 ..................................... 111.3 0.00
Generalized exchange (cyclic) ................... 5.8 10 0.59
Groote Eylandt suggested the possibility of a Kariera or Aranda system,
although the section-by-section exchange pattern did not show evidence
of either system. Dyadic sister-exchange marriage insists on a symmetry
such that, if women from block 1 go to men in block 7, then women in
block 7 should go to men in block 1. An eight-block partition yields 24
possible cross-moiety block pairings, none of which fit the data (P , .001
for all pairs). These models are reported in table 4. There is no evidence
that dyadic exchange of women occurs across blocks of structural equiva-
lents: marriage on Groote Eylandt is neither governed by a Kariera nor
an Aranda system.
Inspection of table 3 clearly shows that the structure of marriage across
blocks on Groote Eylandt is a cycle. This cycle is represented in figure 6.
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Fig. 6.—The exchange of women across blocks
It is possible to capture this cycle with a model that tests for the presence
of generalized exchange. The generalized exchange model is a log-linear
model that fits one additional parameter to the random association model
to represent cyclic exchange. It is a quasi-independence model in which
the marginals and cells corresponding to the cycle are fitted uniquely. The
model posits no association among rows and columns for the remaining
cells. This model is similar to the “topological” model introduced by
Hauser (1978), which fits the contours of a mobility table. Viewed this
way, the “contours” are the cells identified as receivers and givers under
generalized exchange.20 This model fits the data extremely well (G2 5 5.8;
df 5 10; P 5 .59). The improvement of the model fit over the independence
and paired sister-exchange models is tremendous: the model reflecting
chain generalized exchange accounts for most of the total association be-
tween origins as “sisters” and destinations as “wives.”
Inconsistent Relations
There are some clear inconsistencies in the exchange pattern reported in
table 3. Four women from block 2 (moiety 2), marry a male in block 1,
20 The equation for the quasi-independence model (Agresti 1990, p. 132, eq. [5.4]) is
log mij 5 µ 1 λXi 1 λYj 1 λXYij ,
where λXYij 5 1, when i 5 1, j 5 5; i 5 2, j 5 6; i 5 3, j 5 7; i 5 4, j 5 8; i 5 5, j
5 2; i 5 6, j 5 3; i 5 7, j 5 4; i 5 8, j 5 1; and λXYij 5 0 for all other values of i
and j.
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where, in order to yield a perfect cycle, the “correct” marriages ought to
be with males in block 4. These four women are married to one male
(identified numerically as #81) reported by Rose (1960, pp. 84, 80) as “by
no means sure of his position and [he] apparently lived in daily fear that
he would lose the girls, a fact which was apparently responsible for his
living in virtual isolation.” While #81’s marriages (the result of stealing
wives from male #46) did not violate stated norms (all were called “O,”
or wife), clearly they were perceived to be incorrect by natives. My model
suggests why #81 was so uncomfortable.
Likewise, one of the two exchanges from block 8 to block 6 (where the
“correct” exchange should have been to block 3) involved a woman (#68)
whose husband (#168) was murdered by another Aborigine (#154) as he
attempted to steal her. Rose notes that #168 called #68 “daughter’s daugh-
ter” before she was stolen by #154. Subsequently, #154 was tried by ordeal
for killing #168. This trial seems to have involved most of the males on
the island and consisted of their throwing their spears at #154 while he
stood facing them, unarmed, a short distance away on the beach.21 That
#154 survived was an unlikely outcome in a community of skilled spear
hunters, unless community sentiment was on his side. While not prohib-
ited, the marriage between #168 and #68 was exceptional and was “not
looked on particularly favorably by the society as there was considerable
feeling favoring #154 when he killed #168 in 1943 for ‘wrongly’ marrying
#68” (Rose 1960, p. 149). My model shows that the marriage between #168
and #68 was incorrect. Natives “knew” this even though it violated no
culturally stated norms.22
21 Rose shows photographs of armed Aborigines facing #154 on the beach but does
not describe the “trial.” I conclude that the ordeal must consist of their using their
spears.
22 Clearly, as my AJS reviewers have pointed out, these marriages violated unstated
“norms.” Aborigine #81 was uncomfortable, yet he made marriage choices that were
allowed. Likewise, #168’s marriage to #68, while formally acceptable, was clearly
considered “improper.” Two things are happening. First, natives’ understanding of
local (unarticulated) rules appears in conflict with their formal (articulated) global
rules. Second, natives collectively enforce unarticulated rules, even though they do
not have the language to articulate them. These kinds of asymmetries between local
norms and global rules are frequently observed. Here, by analogy, our understanding
of microlevel (local) rules tells us that it is impolite to invite acquaintances over for
dinner one day after having dinner at their house, even though inviting them over
does not violate the global rule, which is to reciprocate invitations. I show below that
a number of micromechanisms can provide the bases for local knowledge, which,
when followed, are sufficient to generate the observed macrostructure. Note that in
the Kula exchange, natives recognize the global structure explicitly and ignore local
errors, as do we when, e.g., we account for promotions within firms as exceptionally
sensitive to meritocratic criteria. Note also that there are other inconsistencies from
the pure model of cyclic exchange, e.g., the “incorrect” association between a woman
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If the exchanges that can be explained from the ethnographic accounts
are removed from table 3, the generalized exchange model, as expected,
fits much better, accounting for most of the association between origins
and destinations. Whether one works with the “corrected” table or the
original data, it is clear that a system of cyclic exchange occurs between
unrecognized blocks of the tribe. This system ensures solidarity by binding
all members into a chain of univocal prestations, embedding each block
in a network of debt and obligation.
Implications for Classical Kinship Theory
Aborigines who are blocked together because they share structurally
equivalent patterns of kinship relations appear to be members of cultur-
ally unrecognized sections that participate in a system of generalized ex-
change. These induced sections have no connection to the cultural bases
for social identity on Groote Eylandt; age and sex, section, or totemic
group.23 Still, they function as subsections of an elaborate exchange system
in an underground economy of kinship. Implications of this finding are
discussed below.
Discovering a generalized exchange system among real people in the
absence of explicit cultural support is problematic for classical kinship
theory. Little in the Groote Eylandt culture suggests, or points toward,
generalized exchange. Ethnographers trained to see rules missed it even
while natives enforced it. Ethnographers were absolutely right to see a
formal mess, since models of the recognized normative grammar of Groote
Eylandt kinship suggest that there was no clear structure for exchange—
beyond that provided by the negative incest taboo (which yields exogamy
by moiety). But it was precisely by focusing on natives’ norms and pre-
scriptions that classical exchange theorists were able to develop models
of social exchange as a basis for human social solidarity. By far the most
important setting for these theoretical efforts has been classificatory kin-
ship systems, which have provided the grist for some classical models of
human action, from both an individualist (Homans 1962) and structuralist
(Le´vi-Strauss 1969) perspective.
in block 3 (#149) and a man in block 8 (#7), which cannot be specifically accounted
for from Rose’s ethnographic report.
23 Alone this is an intriguing finding that reminds us that the promise of the network
approach to social structure was that it might provide a metric to estimate the salience
of cultural categories for tangible behavior. Often the validity of network results are
based on overlap with categories. In this case, the validity of the blockmodel rests on
the fact that CONCOR induced an exchange structure, which had only a prior theoret-
ical justification. In this way, structural network analysis can be a tool for theory
construction.
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While neither the structuralist nor the individualist perspective com-
pletely works to account for the findings of this article, both Homans (as-
sociated with the individualist perspective) and Le´vi-Strauss (associated
with the structuralist perspective) point somewhat in the right direction.
Homans was right when he recognized that norms do not matter as much
as practical behavior. Likewise, his recognition that a stable macrostruc-
ture for exchange is likely to be the product of stable micro-level mecha-
nisms is one that I am extremely sympathetic to and develop further be-
low. On the other hand, his account of MBD over FZD marriage
(preference) in classificatory kinship systems is falsified by the Groote Ey-
landt case, since Homans’s micromodel, built from dyadic exchange alone,
explicitly rejects the possibility of what we can observe—indirect, or chain
generalized exchange. Exchanges in which giver and taker roles do not
alternate within dyads cannot be analyzed as an aberrant form of direct
dyadic exchange. Nor can other micromechanisms governing marriage
choice, for example, familiarity, play a significant role in structuring ex-
change outcomes when the culturally recognized exchange units—section,
totemic group, and locality—appear as independent of the observed struc-
ture. In light of these findings, Homans’s theory does not provide a plausi-
ble explanation of the actual exchange pattern observed on Groote Ey-
landt.
Le´vi-Strauss fares better than Homans. On one hand, I find an ex-
change system—chain generalized exchange—that he predicts should ex-
ist. More striking, Le´vi-Strauss’s prediction that generalized exchange oc-
curs in harmonic regimes (systems with both patrilineal descent and
patrilocal residence) is supported by the results of this analysis. This is
significant since the linkage of disharmonic regimes with restricted ex-
change and harmonic regimes with cyclical exchange is absolutely central
to Le´vi-Strauss’s argument in Elementary Structures of Kinship. It is a
terrific achievement in science to predict from theoretical grounds alone
a fact only later observed.
On the other hand, discovering generalized exchange where it is not
normatively prescribed creates some significant dilemmas for the Le´vi-
Straussian argument. All societies prohibit incest, but few prescribe that
men must marry women who are in a given relation to them. This is
what classificatory kinship systems do. In section systems, it is the kinship
terminology that defines the marriage rules and thus the principle of reci-
procity (indirect or direct) that governs the society (Korn 1973, p. 15).
On Groote Eylandt, chain generalized exchange occurs when these basic
normative elements of the kinship system are muddled, contradictory, and
incoherent. This should not happen, at least theoretically.
In Elementary Structures of Kinship, Le´vi-Strauss (1969, p. 45) shows
that “the woman whom one does not take, and whom one may not take
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is for that very reason, offered up.” People do distinguish themselves from
dogs and other animals by prohibiting the use of their own values, induc-
ing social scarcity, and forcing themselves to place values in circulation.
This is a stunning cultural achievement, and so exchange does rest on the
fundamental opposition between nature and culture. But the mere fact of
an opposition between nature and culture tells us nothing about the social
structure through which values, a bone here or a spouse there, are actually
exchanged to yield coherent role relations between persons or groups. For
Le´vi-Strauss, coherent exchange systems must be built from positive
norms governing the circulation of values that extend beyond the negative
incest taboo. Because we are able to observe generalized exchange in the
absence of such norms on Groote Eylandt, there is little support for the
central idea that structures for exchange are also necessarily cultural
achievements.24
In sum, Le´vi-Strauss predicted the right thing (generalized exchange)
for the wrong reason (normative rules). Homans was right (culturally
stated rules do not matter, and local choice governed by some micromech-
anism does) for the wrong reason (indirect exchange does occur). I take
what is right from both and, combining them, argue that there must be
some set of nonnormative, yet “cultural” micromechanisms at play that
are capable of generating indirect exchange. Discussing these mechanisms
is the next goal. The relevant literature focuses on models that can account
for emergent structures.
Emergent Structures
For generalized exchange to occur in the absence of positive prescriptions,
there must be one or more micromechanisms acting on individuals to
guide their choice of a spouse with sufficient clarity to yield a consistent
exchange system. Because neither formal accounts of the system nor
chance events adequately tell us how practical behavior is routinely struc-
tured, it must be the case that the consistent operation of a micromechan-
ism yields the emergent structure I observe.25
24 Note that the problem is not the lack of fit between culturally recognized sections
and the induced blocks yielded from the analysis of Groote Eylandt relational data,
for Le´vi-Strauss recognizes that natives cannot always name the units that exchange
wives beyond the level of moiety. Rather, the problem is the lack of fit between stated
norms governing exchange, which do not yield a cycle, and the observed exchange
pattern, which is a cycle.
25 We can manage to avoid accounting for emergent structures by enumerating the
chance events whose coupling made it possible. Of course, amazing conjunctures of
events and processes may yield robust structures as their products, but as explanation
they stretch the limits of parsimony. Consider White’s (1992, p. 243) characterization
of the structuralist conjecture: “The structuralist conjecture is . . . illustrated by Le´vi-
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By emergent structures I mean informal structures of interaction that,
while unintended and unnamed, are still robust, lasting well beyond the
experience of any single individual or interacting population of persons
in the cross section. In settings closer to home than Groote Eylandt, we are
familiar with emergent structures of this kind: vacancy chains governing
promotion opportunities in firms (White 1970; Chase 1991), balanced op-
position and ranked strata-systems in high schools and the stability of
clique structures within adolescent society (Coleman 1963; Davis 1967,
1970), marginality in informal social networks (Romo 1991), and so forth.26
We generally observe that these emergent structures within densely inter-
connected complex organizations, like firms, high schools, and kinship sys-
tems, are frequently orthogonal to those posited by norms or cultural rep-
resentations of underlying processes (Chase 1991; Kontopoulos 1993).
Informal structures tend to cut across formal grids (Mayer 1960; White
1992). It should, therefore, be expected that, if we identify an emergent
structure organizing spouse choice among Aborigines, it would cut across
formal, normatively endorsed, expectations.
Many possible micromotives and micromechanisms have been pro-
posed to explain emergent structures (for reviews, see Kontopoulos 1993;
White 1992; Chase 1997). The micromechanism operating on Groote Ey-
landt must channel individual action into an observable exchange struc-
ture at the macro level. There is not much to work with on Groote Ey-
landt, aside from kinship relations. There is no ethnicity. Inequality is
embedded within the kinship system. Beyond moiety, the extent of social
differentiation is limited. Classificatory kinship insists that everyone get
their kinship relations into line, so that they know who they are. They
have to do it consistently since changes in a single relation will reverberate
wildly throughout the system, ultimately involving all group members.
Strauss’s theory (1969) of marriage alliances in which the whole social organization
of a tribe plays out within one of a few overall structuralist schemes of balancing
among splits and alliances. Genesis is always the problem. . . . [By] what staggeringly
unlikely concatenation of constituents did some such marvelously singular system of
integration come into being?” Demographic constraint, chance encounters with new
people peddling new ways of doing things, gerontocracy, the possibility of exchange
cycles of other values circulating across persons or sections, etc., could all contribute
in some unknown way to the appearance of generalized exchange on Groote Eylandt.
Maybe an airplane full of trinkets landed, introducing a new currency and setting
into motion a new exchange system. Who knows? It could have been this way. But,
like native spouse choice, the problem with this style of explanation is ultimately about
preserving degrees of freedom.
26 This is because people who are trying to get things done and solve substantive
problems, such as whom to marry, whom to talk to in the school cafeteria, or who
to line up behind in order to get a promotion, cannot afford to take normative self-
representations seriously as guides for action. So they do not.
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Therefore, the mechanisms have to work on kinship relations, that is, on
what Aborigines call one another. The mechanisms have to reflect practi-
cal interactions and be tied to practical behavior.
There is evidence that such a practical culture exists in opposition to
those formal rules that natives articulate. Consider, for example, Rose’s
(1960, p. 142) argument that, on Groote Eylandt, “the usual Murngin
method of reckoning kin does not always operate within the clan, for,
when there have been wrong marriages, the practice of tracing descent
through the mother and ignoring the father does not function. This keeps
the kinship position of offspring of such a marriage adjusted to the organi-
zation of his group.” If kinship does not line up the right way, the natives
account for kin relations in a new way, thus adjusting, on the fly, the
relational structure within the clan, and consequently, beyond it. The ex-
tent of local adjustment is significant: roughly 20% of all relationships
observed by Rose had changed by the time of Worsley’s fieldwork, just
a few years later.27
I now turn to the identification of possible microlevel sources of cyclic
exchange, focusing first on identifying operators that work to reproduce
existing cyclic exchange structures, and second, on identifying operators
that may be tied to the generation of such systems. The obvious starting
points are two social-psychological theories that posit a clear relationship
between microlevel behavior and macrostructure: rational choice and bal-
ance theory.
Rational Choice and the Reproduction of Exchange Cycles
In an important article, Yamagishi and Cook (1993) show that, in experi-
mental situations, actors in exchange cycles corresponding to a perfect
system of chain generalized exchange will cooperate with others by offer-
ing univocal exchanges in expectation of subsequent cooperation of others
in the cycle. Yamagishi and Cook (1993) show that cyclic exchange struc-
tures similar to that observed on Groote Eylandt assume the form of an
N-person assurance game and are thus extremely robust, since it is always
in each individual’s interest to cooperate (by exchanging) rather than to
defect (by refusing to place values into circulation). They thus establish
that rational action is consistent with continued cooperation in cyclic ex-
change structures. Once established, cyclic exchange structures are self-
reproducing from the rational actions of individual participants.
An especially important aspect of Yamagishi and Cook’s (1993) experi-
mental findings is that actors in an exchange cycle need not recognize the
27 Personal correspondence with Douglas White, May 1996.
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macrostructure in which they are embedded, in order to act strategically
by cooperating through univocal exchange. The local views they have of
the system (focused only on the receiving and sending pair) are sufficient
to block free riding in a context of familiarity and trust. Local rationality
can thus catenate exchanges into a robust global structure independent
of cultural norms.
While rational choice can provide a plausible micromechanism for the
reproduction of cyclic exchange structures, it cannot help us understand
the etiology of such systems, for “strategic action” as a micromotor can
yield any number of different social exchange structures.28 Beyond this,
cooperation, which generates trust as its by-product, is only rational in a
context of mutual trust. Climbing out of this circle from within rational
choice is not easy. What is needed is a dynamic model capable of account-
ing for the evolutionary emergence of cooperation across multiple itera-
tions (Macy 1991; Kim and Bearman 1997).
Balance Theory and the Reproduction of Exchange Cycles
Rational choice theory is consistent with cyclic exchange once a cycle is
produced. Perhaps not surprisingly, balance theory, which states that indi-
viduals (or interacting family units, as seen here) will structure their social
relations with other actors in order to avoid cognitive dissonance (Davis
1970; Wasserman and Faust 1995), is also consistent with a pure exchange
cycle. Given a cycle of size N, it follows definitionally that all of the constit-
uent triads embedded in the cycle will balance. More strikingly, the preser-
vation of balance across all N-sections of an exchange cycle is sufficient
to prevent subgroup cleavage, as well as other forms of individual free
riding. As long as each actor in the cycle locally adjusts his or her kinship
relations to fit those within their moiety, they will jointly yield a macro-
structure that reproduces the initial cycle. As with rational choice, actors
may, but need not, see the macrostructure in order to achieve this. All
that is required is the ability to organize one’s within-moiety kin relations
consistently. The exercise of balance at the local level—making sure, for
example, that the person one calls “brother” calls one’s sisters “sister,” and
one’s mother “mother,” and so forth—yields the reproduction of an ex-
isting exchange cycle.
28 See, e.g., the work of numerous exchange theorists who show how different games
yield different rational strategies and hence outcomes. It is worth noting here that,
despite implicit claims to the contrary, one cannot infer microlevel strategies from
observed outcomes, as multiple strategies that are rational within a single game can
often yield the same outcome. Granovetter (1978) identified the same problem in his
analysis of threshold models in collective action contexts.
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On the other hand, as with rational choice, balance across the relevant
sections of a kinship system does not have to yield a pure exchange cycle
as a macrostructure. Thus, for example, both Aranda and Kariera kinship
systems are locally balanced, yet neither yields a cycle similar to that iden-
tified in this article. Cycles are thus necessarily balanced, but balance does
not provide by itself—any more than does rational choice—the sufficient
condition for the generation of a pure exchange cycle. Neither micromotor
by itself helps make sense of how such systems emerged.
The Etiology of Cyclic Exchange
Neither balance nor rational choice alone provides a plausible and effi-
cient mechanism for the evolution of trust and cooperative behavior nec-
essary to generate an exchange cycle. Although both, once in place, pro-
vide an efficient micromechanism for the reproduction of an exchange
cycle. How do cycles get started, then? One idea is that kinship cycles
emerge out of a gerontocratic social structure.
In a brilliant article, “The Matrilateral Implications of Structural Cross-
Cousin Marriage,” Hammel (1973, p. 145) shows that, “independent of
motivations, preferences, culture, symbols, or ideology,” a subtle nonkin-
ship age bias in the selection of spouses carries huge implications for the
kinship systems that emerge. Specifically, Hammel demonstrates from
simulation models of over 14,000 marriages that the mean age bias be-
tween spouses is strongly correlated (.79) with a matrilateral bias (here,
MBD over FZD marriage) in cross-cousin marriages. Just focusing on
societies in which the mean age difference between spouses is 10 years
or greater, Hammel shows that on average, the matrilateral bias is .67.
Furthermore, Hammel (1976, p. 164) notes that “an increase of one year
in the mean absolute age bias increases the proportion of matrilateral
skewing by 2 percent.” Recall that the mean age difference between
spouses on Groote Eylandt is strikingly large, averaging 18 years for
women in moiety 1 and 17.5 years for women in moiety 2. Such age biases
(with 24–27-year-old men marrying girls aged 0–1 year old) are the prod-
uct of pronounced gerontocracy. Hammel demonstrates, and Rose con-
firms, that such age biases may generate a substantial matrilateral bias,
itself a necessary component of a cyclic exchange system. Consider, in this
light, Le´vi-Strauss’s (1969, p. 194) comment that “to claim, as Leach does,
that a system of matrilateral marriage is not necessarily circular . . . is the
same as asserting that a cyclist who kept the handle-bars of his bicycle
turned in the same direction would not go round in a circle. . . . For a
matrilateral system to be totally devoid of circularity, the number of ‘local
lines’ would have to be infinite.” Cultures need not recognize the impact
of age skewing on marriage choices explicitly. On Groote Eylandt, all they
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have to do, for example, is adjust such choices to the local kinship system,
either by following the demands of local balance or by participating in a
“strategic game” of rational alliance formation.
Why Generalized Exchange?
All exchange systems yield solidarity as their by-product, as they embed
actors in chains of mutual obligation and debt. But different systems pro-
vide different levels of solidarity. In direct dyadic exchange, exploitation
can occur because of the norm of reciprocity. Skilled actors build on ambi-
guity over valuation in exchange and thereby profit from within the ex-
change relation. Those exploited by reciprocity norms may appeal to the
group for redress, but other actors may be indifferent to exchange out-
comes among other pairs and therefore fail to sanction the exploiter.29
The inherent tendency in restricted exchange systems is toward increased
inequality and differentiation between and within exchange pairs. Beyond
this, the structure of a society bound together by dyadic exchange is at
risk of subgroup cleavages. Thus the roots of endogenous change processes
lie within restricted exchange systems. These processes heighten social
differentiation on bases other than kinship and hence fuel their own
breakdown.
In chain generalized exchange, on the other hand, where roles as giver
and taker are fixed at the dyadic level, exploitation within exchange
guided by the norm of reciprocity is limited. Equals exchange, and only
a violation of reciprocity norms allows exchangers to obtain more values.
Since these violations affect all actors equally, social solidarity is protected
from subgroup cleavage and free riding, yielding a more secure form of
social solidarity.30 A macrolevel structure of chain generalized exchange,
crafted from microlevel behaviors that reproduce balance, build social
solidarity and trust, and serve individual as well as group interests, can
presumably last for ages. Such structures appear immune to endogenous
29 Note that, since bilateral exchange among sections is less an exchange between two
individuals than between two groups, members of a group contemplating exploitation
may be put under pressure from within their own group to conform. This kind of
internal governance mitigates against pressures from within the exchange relation
pushing toward subgroup cleavage. I am indebted to an AJS reviewer for raising this
point.
30 It might appear that in cyclic exchange, if block A sends women to block B, and
block B to block C, and block C to block D, the failure of block D to send women
to block A affects only block A (since A is then a net loser of women). But, D’s failure
to send women to A ultimately affects B, C, and D, since A lacks the means to send
women in subsequent generations. Therefore, all actors are affected equally when the
temporal order of exchange is ignored.
1413
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 13 Feb 2015 15:05:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Journal of Sociology
sources of change. Change, when it is observed, is likely to come from an
exogenous shock. No wonder we found generalized exchange in a “primi-
tive” society insulated from the chaotic events of modern life occurring
beyond its borders. But we should not be too heartbroken by modernity’s
path, for it is not simply ironic that the most elegant structural systems
for group cohesion seem to appear in social systems dominated by familiar
structures of inequality (gerontocracy and patriarchy), which stand in an
uneasy relation to our own (modern) normative claims.
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